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Showing posts with label BP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BP. Show all posts

Monday, November 8, 2010

BURN: Blogger Looking Pretty Shiney On Deepwater Horizon

A certain blogger (a-hem) wrote months ago to dispel a number of myths about the Deepwater Horizon incident.  


Just today, the story is breaking that the probe into the incident is finding what that certain blogger was saying they would find.
“We certainly found no evidence that anyone had scrimped on safety, for example, to save money,” William Reilly, co- chairman of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, told reporters at a break in the commission’s meeting in Washington. He later said, “What we have really heard today is a story of what appears to be several very human decisions made by competent professionals who missed signals.”
There were a series of challenges that had to be addressed,” said Reilly, a former head of the Environmental Protection Agency. “It looks as though, by and large, almost every one of the responses to those challenges was justifiable and professional.”
To that was added this assessment--
Panel Chief Counsel Fred Bartlit, who presented the preliminary findings, touched on the role of BP’s wells-team leader, John Guide, who vetoed a proposal to install equipment that may have kept explosive natural gas from seeping into the well and jetting up to the floating rig.
“We have not seen a single instance where a human being made a conscious decision to favor dollars to safety,” Bartlit said.
Henry Waxman, eat dooky!

Of course, none of the CongressIdiots like Waxman, or the enviro-nuts who smeared everyone in general...and the drilling industry in particular...will EVER be called to task for the crap they spewed (far exceeding the effects of the oil spill).  Too bad...

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

CRASH: Hesitation In New Gulf Well Cap Supports Concern

UPDATED: My speculation confirmed
BP and the government have hesitated in the fitting and testing of a new cap, hyped as capable of capturing nearly all the oil flowing from the Deepwater Horizon blow-out.

This seems to support the theory that there are indications of a casing rupture or other really catastrophic problem (i.e., cement failure) with the well.


This comes in concert with news that the private and government players conducted a seismic mapping...perhaps a photographic mapping, as well...of the sea floor near the well-bore.

The press stories relating to this new cap suggest that the test process included sequential closing of valves, which would presumably increase the back-pressure inside the casing.  The delay that we are seeing could be explained by a concern among the engineering minds that this pressure rise would further rupture the casing or cement down-hole.  This would potentially cause a further loss of control, perhaps even below the point of entry of the relief wells now nearing completion.

As reported here, there are indications that this well could be a worse beast than is popularly understood, much less reported in the MSM.

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

BURN: On That Poor Harassed Photog At The BP Refinery

A whole lot of people...all of whom should have known better...got all wee-weed up over a recent incident at a Texas City refinery.  This is silly.

On both Right and Left ends of the blogosphere, people have been hyperventilating over the fact a photographer was stopped by BP security, local police, and DHS personnel.  The apparent excuse for this nonsense is the juxtaposition of the terms "BP" and "press".

But, c'mon, people!  This is a BP refinery.  It has NOTHING to do with the Deepwater Horizon.  I mean NOTHING.

And the people who corralled the photographer were doing their jobs.  We like that.  Since 9/11, we have been a little sensitive about folks paying unwonted attention to refineries.  They are known to make remarkably attractive targets for terrorists, and they are kind of...I dunno...volatile.

The Obamic lid on the coverage of the Gulf non-response is a BIG issue.  But, please, let us be real.

Friday, June 25, 2010

BURN: Exploring The Popular Myths About BP's "Culpable Conduct"

There are a LOT of myths about BP's "culpable conduct" abroad in the land.  Without the least intent to exonerate BP, it is always wise to deal with reality.

Let's start with a few predicates:
  1. Culpable conduct (recklessness, gross negligence, or even simple negligence) is NOT a mistake in judgment.  From a legal stand-point, even to get to simple negligence in a technical field means violation of a "standard of care" that is a known quantity in that field.
  2. Most of the people writing...especially in the MSM...about the Deepwater Horizon incident know nothing about the technology of drilling for oil.
  3. Many of the people who are making comments on this matter are not "disinterested" by any stretch.
  4. Virtually nobody...except people who are not commenting...knows what happened when the well blew out.
  5. Drilling for oil presents risks; it is not a "absolutely safe" proposition...EVER.
On Thursday, June 24th, no less a conservative pundit than Allahpundit, writing on Hot Air, had this to say--
As for the liability cap, I don’t get Napolitano’s point. Yes, in theory it creates a moral hazard by limiting BP’s losses to $75 million, but in practice the cap doesn’t apply in cases involving gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violations of federal safety regs. No surprise, then, that BP has said it’ll waive the cap and pay all legitimate claims: In essence, by taking so many risks with the rig, they waived the cap long ago and accepted the prospect of catastrophic losses.
As a commenter on that thread, I challenged Allahpundit to support the various assumptions in that statement.  He did not respond directly with any of the support I requested.

I assert that we...the American people...know very little about the actual events, or the conduct of BP and its vendors who were part of the drilling operation on the Gulf.

There are several things that seem well established, however--
  1. Since not later than sometime in February, this well was a beast...a well that showed every sign of going out of control.
  2. The regulators were well aware of this.
  3. There is essentially NOTHING that BP could do operationally that did not require approval of at least one Federal regulatory agency.
  4. BP was in the process of plugging and abandoning (P&A) this well in an effort to do the only thing possible when a well presents the kind of potential for catastrophic loss of control that this one did.
  5. EVERYONE involved on the operational end of EVERYTHING in the Gulf was dealing with many millions of dollars of equipment, and many of them were "going to be the first to know" if what they did was the wrong thing.  They had their careers and their lives on the line.

Lets look at some of the myths:

Myth One: "Time after time, it appears that BP made decisions that increased the risk of a blowout to save the company time or expense. If this is what happened, BP's carelessness and complacency have inflicted a heavy toll on the Gulf, its inhabitants, and the workers on the rig," said Democratic Reps. Henry A. Waxman and Bart Stupak.

Easy for two Washington demagogues to say.  They have no idea what they're talking about.  But notice the term "it appears", and the term "time or expense".  Even they were leaving themselves an out.  Time in a wild well situation is a precious commodity, and it is grossly unfair to link it to "expense".  It is rational to assume that nobody on that rig was worried about expense.  They were worried about getting off that hole...alive, and with the vessel on which they worked intact.  Time was one thing they knew they might not have. 

There is a specific vignette about a recommendation from Halliburton that BP use twenty-one centralizers...devices that attach to casing as it is run into the well-bore to keep it evenly spaced relative to the bore, allowing cement to flow uniformly around it..., which was over-ridden by someone at BP; "It will take 10 hours to install them. I do not like this."  Centralizers are very inexpensive, as oil drilling components go.  Was BP trying to save a few hundred dollars, or time in deciding to use fewer than Halliburton suggested?  To me, the answer is obvious.  Time.  That is a judgment call, not recklessness, or even negligence.  Indeed, it may have been the absolutely responsible thing to do.

Myth Two: BP broke regulations.  The only support for that (of which I know) comes from the admitted failure by BP to certify the BOP (blow-out preventer) on this well for the MMS.  But it is also established that this was SOP, and MMS approved the drilling plan subsequently, as apparently was their practice. 

Myth Three: The BOP failed.  We simply don't know what happened, but from experience I can tell you this; a fully functional BOP takes time to work.  Sometimes, that is time that a drilling crew simply is denied by the forces in play.  One thing I can tell about the people writing about a "BOP failure" is they don't have a clue what they're talking about.  A BOP is a wonderfully reliable, proven, and redundant technology...that is NOT fail-safe.  Most people writing about BOPs (like they are authorities) tell us they shear off the pipe with powerful rams.  That is about a quarter true...maybe less.  There are three sets of rams...at least...in a common BOP; pipe rams, designed to close around whatever size pipe is in the well; blind rams, which simply shutter off the well; and "shears" which are the ones people write about, and which are used as a last resort because of the damage they do.  Additionally, on virtually any BOP I've worked around, there is an "annular" section, designed to squeeze around whatever pipe is in the well, something like an inner-tube inflating against a fixed outside wall would squeeze whatever was inside its inner circumference.

Something else I've been wondering: are there conditions in which fully closing in a well may be the wrong thing to do?  This is outside my kin, but I can imagine that such a decision might be called for if there was a fear that fully shutting in a ramping well might rupture the casing (tubular lining inside the well that is NOT pipe, but which writers call "pipe" commonly), or blow out partially cured cement.  There are suggestions about the behavior of this well that indicate the casing IS ruptured.

Myth Four: BP chose an inferior method ("long-string" versus a more expensive and TIME CONSUMING "tie-back") method for lining the well-bore.  Here is why that is BS; both methods are acceptable...and accepted...in the industry and by its regulators.  It is VERY unlikely BP made this election without regulatory approval.  And, again, the decision may have been made to save TIME, rather than out of any financial consideration.  These are facts that await revelation.  But to say one was "inferior" is simply stupid; the method chosen may, in fact, have had advantages over the other method.  Also, it is something like saying after a terrible accident, "He should have been driving the Mercedes, instead of the inferior Chevy".  Both are fine under any normal condition.  The observation is hindsight of the meanest species.


Those are just a few myths.  But let me leave you with some real-time statements that I think illustrate how seriously the people involved were treating this beast of a well: 
In an e-mail, BP engineer Brian Morel told a fellow employee that the company is likely to make last-minute changes in the well.
"We could be running it [I assume casing]  in 2-3 days, so need a relative quick response. Sorry for the late notice, this has been nightmare well which has everyone all over the place," Morel wrote.
The e-mail chain culminated with the following message by another worker: "This has been a crazy well for sure."
 Those are not the words of the normally calm, collected, and relatively fearless people who drill off-shore.  They are the words of people who face an unusual threat, and are trying to make it safe.

Friday, June 18, 2010

CRASH: Stuck On STUPID Government Mandates Disaster

Perverse incentives yield monstrous results.  Barack Hussain and his BIG GOVERNMENT fellow travelers churn out perverse incentives like nothing ever seen in America.  One disaster after another will result, as sure as night follows day.

I don't know who observed this first, but failure by BIG GOVERNMENT...or the Collective...is not a bug, but a feature.  Meaning, it is built into the system, and can't be "built out" of the system.  It is organic.  What is so damnable is that we know this.  History is rich with horrific examples, as are current events.

Obama and his collective own the Gulf disaster; front to back, port to starboard, top to bottom.

There is a Deepwater Horizon ONLY because perverse incentives yield monstrous results.  We are drilling for oil in 5,000+ feet of water ONLY because of stupid, perverse, and dangerous environmental policy, which is, in turn, predicated on lies.  Instead of drilling in safe places on land and shallow water, which we do with astounding reliability, we have been pushed to the limits of technology.  We told people to do risky things, and they did.  They always WILL.

Every aspect of the Deepwater Horizon operation was under Federal control.  That is, they did nothing of any significance without approval by one agency or another.  All those agencies are Mr. Obama's responsibility.  All the law and regulation is his charge to enforce.  Of course, nobody can, really.  And no set of people can, either.  Our government is vastly too large, and our regulations far too numerous and tangled.  They, many of them, are written on false premises, and only reflect the political "thinking" of their authors.  They are perverse, and can only yield monstrous results 

We told BP they should certify that a blow-out preventer (in the last of at least three redundant systems to shut in a wild well) would cut and crush the drill stem used in the well.  But nobody at the MMS enforced that certification requirement.  So nobody at BP (and presumptively other oil companies) provided the certification.  When you have a regulator, you do what they require.  Many regulations are ignored by both the regulators and the regulated.  And the regulated think in terms of the regulation being where their limits are, and forget about reality being where real limits are.  Perverse incentives yield monstrous results.

The Dutch offered us skimmer vessels that would have cleaned the oil out of the water of the Gulf at huge rates.  Our government turned them down, some say because of the Jones Act (a 1920 law to protect shipping interests and maritime unions), or because the discharged water from the Dutch ships was not pristine according to EPA (there being some fraction of some component of crude oil in the discharge).  So, the full tide of crude made it to our beaches and marshes.  Now we learn the skimmer technology is at work.  Too late.  So, another disaster, directly caused by perverse incentives.


The Dutch also offered dredges and people who know how VERY QUICKLY to produce berms specifically for the purpose of protecting the shore from oil.  This was a proven technology.  Nope.   The Jones Act again, and the welter of Federal agencies who have to say grace over anything like that, regardless of the temporary nature of the berms.  So disaster comes ashore while bureaucrats dither (and collect their pay).

The Obama administration lied, and they imposed a moratorium on deep water drilling.  They say it was intended to increase safety, but they know that is a lie; it has the opposite effect.  They say it was a decision based on engineering.  That is a lie, too.  The experts they consulted told them the opposite, and that Gulf operations could and should be continued after a safety review that would take, at most, weeks.  They were ignored, and a purely political decision was made to shut down the Gulf deep water drilling.  That produces a disaster all its own, and it is one that plainly derives from the perverse incentives of Barack Hussain Obama.


These are merely a few of the stories of which we know.  We will learn many more over time.  They all have the same moral; perverse incentives produce monstrous results.  Failure by BIG GOVERNMENT is not a bug, but a feature.

We learned today of a check in the work being done in Louisiana by private vessels.  They were stopped by the Coast Guard, and shut down so that life vests and extinguishers could be checked.  Perverse incentives yielding monstrous results.  It is what BIG GOVERNMENT does.

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

CRASH: Irrelevent Crazy Ugly People Blind Innocent W. Houstonians

In a brazen, unprovoked attack on unsuspecting law-abiding Houstonians, Code Puke hags descended on the headquarters of BP.  Thousands reportedly suffered permanent damage to optical nerves.  Others, driven to madness by the sight and sound of the crones, were seen stabbing themselves in the eyes and ears.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xFTaQCV3aI&NR=1

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WPwW12Woj0s&NR=1



Immediately following their carnage, the Code Puke carlins mounted their brooms  bicycles  BMWs and Mercedes, and fled the scene of their horrors.